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Summary 
This bachelor thesis explores compulsory licensing under the TRIPS-Agreement 
as a tool for technology transfer to the developing world. After illustrating the 
relevant intellectual property rights, it highlights the relevant passages of the 
TRIPS-Agreement, the Doha Declaration, the August 30 Agreement and other 
relevant documents, in order to investigate all the relevant information and 
determine if compulsory licensing is, as intended, a good tool for technology 
transfer. The investigation focuses primarily on pharmaceuticals. 
The conclusion reached from this investigation was chiefly that compulsory 
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement is indeed a useful tool for technology 
transfer to the developing world.
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Abstract 
In an era of globalization, international legal frameworks and vigorous 
international politics, we cannot refrain from hearing about the extensive health 
crisis of the developing world. HIV/AIDS, Malaria and drug resistant tuberculosis 
are only a few of the widespread disease which appear almost surreal to the 
citizens of the industrial world. The debates and discussions regarding the 
importance of aiding the developing nations inter alia through the international 
legal framework are persistent. The transfer of essential technology, such as 
pharmaceuticals, is vital if the crisis is to be eradicated, thus the need for an 
international legal framework which supports the needs of the developing world is 
indisputable.  
Since the international legal framework is immense, and far too comprehensive to 
be analyzed in a bachelor thesis, the purpose of this essay is to analyze the 
TRIPS-Agreement of the WTO, i.e. the Agreement on Trade Related aspects of 
Intellectual Property rights, and investigate to what extent this legal framework is 
a useful tool for technology transfer to the developing nations. Particularly, focus 
will be on compulsory licensing as a tool for technology transfer. 
The method employed was firstly a profound study of the TRIPS-Agreement and 
other relevant sources, followed by a research on compulsory licensing. 
Furthermore, due to the extent of the term “technology”, focus will be on 
pharmaceuticals.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Context 
 
According to UNAIDS, the number of people infected with HIV in sub-Saharan 
Africa, were 25 million in 2003, and by that year more than 2 million had already 
died of AIDS.
1
 By 2009, however, the number of people infected had fallen to 
22.5 million, and although this number reflects a slight improvement, it is still far 
too great. Furthermore, this number makes up for 68% of global HIV burden,
2
 
reflecting the fact that the region is the most affected by HIV in the world. 
Despite the extensive international cooperation, only 7% of the infected people in 
developing countries in general had access to the pharmaceuticals required for 
treatment in 2003.
3
 This is to a great extent a result of the prices set by the 
pharmaceutical industry for its patented medicines; the prices are simply too high, 
making it impossible for developing countries to acquire the relevant 
pharmaceuticals.
4
 This is only one example of poor technology transfer, which is 
the topic of this essay.  
As opposed to the 18
th
 century when industrialization began in western Europe,
5
 
we currently have the skills and knowledge of what is needed in order to attain 
economic growth and development. Today it is common knowledge that 
                                                 
1 UNAID, Fact sheet, AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa, www.unaids.org, “Facilitating compulsory 
licensing under TRIPS in Response to the AIDS Crisis in Developing Countries”, Lidgard., H., Atik., J., 
Loyola Law School Los Angeles, 2005, p.3 
22 UNAIDS, Fact sheet 
3 UNAID, Fact sheet, see also Lidgard & Atik., p.3 
4 “Embracing Price Discrimination: TRIPS and the Suppression of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals”, 
Lidgard., Hans, Atik, Jeff, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2007, p. 1044 
5 “Världens ekonomiska historia”, Cameron, R., Neal, L., Studentlitteratur, 2006 
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technology is essential for growth.
6
 Therefore, it is vital that developing countries 
gain significant access to the acutely needed transfer of technology in order to 
experience an improvement of the public health crisis, subsequently resulting in a 
reduction of poverty levels. 
There are many perspectives from which one could view technology transfer, 
however in the context of this thesis, the most useful perspective is that of the 
TRIPS Agreement, which is one of the three most essential international 
agreements of the WTO. The TRIPS Agreement, i.e. the “Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights”, was adopted in 1994 in 
Marrakech, and regulates intellectual property.
7
 Since all WTO member states are 
bound by, in principle, all the WTO Agreements, the TRIPS Agreement’s 
regulation of intellectual property rights is essential in the world today. 
The notion in developing countries is typically that the comprehensive nature of 
intellectual property rights granted by the TRIPS Agreement is what causes a 
significant problem in accessing technology transfer. If vital technology, such as 
pharmaceuticals, were not patented, developing nations could legally produce the 
technology themselves without breaking any international laws or agreements, 
and the poorest nations lacking the resources to produce the medicines themselves 
could purchase them at a price which they find affordable. From this perspective, 
intellectual property rights actually work as a barrier to technology transfer, as 
opposed to a tool intended to promote it.
8
 Naturally, this view is not shared by the 
developed world, who argues that creators of e.g. new technology must be given 
the exclusive right to produce, utilize, offer for sale or sell the invention and 
prevent others from doing so.
9
 Intellectual property rights are viewed as vital for 
creating incentives to innovate,
10
 and are thus essential. 
The international community has recognized the severe health crises in 
developing countries, and has therefore incorporated possibilities into the TRIPS 
Agreement, which are intended to help reduce this problem. One important 
                                                 
6 ”Introduction to Economic Growth”, Jones, C., W.W. Northon & Company, Inc. 2002, page 96. 
7 Wto.org 
8 “Competition law in technology transfer under the TRIPS Agreement”, Nguyen, T., Manuscript for a 
Civil Law Licentiate Seminar, 2007, p.16-17 
9 The TRIPS Agreement Art.8 
10  Nguyen, p.16-17 
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opportunity given by the TRIPS Agreement to address the problem is that of 
compulsory licensing, a means of receiving a license from a patent holder without 
his or her consent.
11
 This thesis investigates if and how compulsory licensing 
under the TRIPS Agreement facilitates the access to technology transfer from the 
developed nations to the developing world. The objective is to see if, from a legal 
perspective, compulsory licensing is a useful tool or not. 
 
1.2 The purpose of the Thesis 
 
The purpose of this bachelor thesis is to investigate compulsory licensing under 
the TRIPS Agreement regarding technology transfer from the industrialized world 
to the developing countries. The aim is to clarify how the TRIPS Agreement, 
through compulsory licensing, enables developing countries to have access to 
technology transfer, which is essential for their domestic economic growth and 
development. Is compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement a useful tool 
for technology transfer to the developing world? This is the question I will 
attempt to answer. The starting points in this investigation are Art.7, Art.8, Art.27, 
Art.30 and Art.31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
1.3 Material and Method 
 
Although there are substantial amounts of materials on the subject, the materials 
that were used first and foremost are the TRIPS-Agreement, the Doha 
Declaration, the August 30 Agreement and relevant articles in scientific journals. 
In order to get the most accurate information, the sources have thus mainly been 
official publications, scientific articles and documents from the WTO and other 
sources. Some sources have been used more than others, though. Two articles that 
have been particularly useful are “Facilitating compulsory licensing under TRIPS 
                                                 
11 TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing countries, and the Doha “Solution”, Law School of The University 
of Chicago, John M. Olin law & economics working paper No. 140, Sykes, A., p.7 
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in Response to the AIDS Crisis in Developing Countries” and “Embracing Price 
Discrimination: TRIPS and the Suppression of Parallel Trade in 
Pharmaceuticals”, both by Hans Henrik Lidgard12 and Jeffery Atik.13 These 
articles have been invaluable for understanding the relationship between 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement and technology transfer to the 
developing world. Another useful article has been “TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, 
Developing countries, and the Doha “Solution”, by Alan O. Sykes,14 which has 
been important for the investigation as a whole, as can be seen from the frequent 
references to it throughout the thesis. Moreover, the manuscript for the Civil Law 
Licentiate Seminar “Competition law in technology transfer under the TRIPS 
Agreement”, by Tu Thahn Nguyen15 has also been greatly helpful. 
The method used was firstly a thorough investigation of the TRIPS Agreement, 
the Doha Declaration, the August 30 Agreement and the ACTA, followed by an 
acquiring of the relevant materials, which have been studied comprehensively. 
The language was intended to be clear, hopefully this objective has been satisfied. 
 
1.4 Delimitation 
 
In this investigation, no particular national laws on IPRs are considered, only the 
international intellectual property rights under the TRIPS Agreement relevant to 
the technology transfer from the industrialized world to the developing countries. 
This is due to the fact that, as briefly mentioned, all WTO member countries are 
bound by the TRIPS, and an investigation comprehensive enough to also 
comprise national laws on intellectual property rights is beyond the scope and 
means of this bachelor thesis.             
                                                 
12 Professor of Law at Lund University, Sweden 
13 Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, USA 
14 Professor of Law, Chicago Law School, USA 
15 Doctor of Law, Lund University, Sweden 
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Since there are many developing countries in the world, and the circumstances 
vary in different continents, focus will be on Sub-Saharan Africa, as the region is 
the poorest one in the world. 
 Furthermore, the term “technology” will in this case generally comprise all sorts 
of technology, such as software, patents, know-how, copyrights, etc. However, 
due to the fact that a bachelor thesis does not allow for an in-depth study of all 
important types of technology relevant to Sub-Saharan Africa, focus will be on 
one type of technology which is an essential, if not the most important, type of 
technology for the region, namely pharmaceuticals. Although the aim is to look 
on technology in general as well, I believe focusing on pharmaceuticals allows 
one to gain deeper knowledge and understanding of how compulsory licensing 
works. 
 
1.5 Thesis disposition 
 
The thesis begins with Chapter 1, which provides the introduction, briefly 
describing the current situation in developing countries (especially sub-Saharan 
Africa) regarding technology, the health crises, and the view on intellectual 
property rights, also portraying why technology transfer is such a vital necessity. 
Furthermore, the chapter states the purpose of the thesis, as well as the materials 
and methods used in the investigation. Lastly, it illustrates the delimitations that 
were made. 
Chapter 2 describes intellectual property rights, mostly patents, and the economic 
implications of these, in order to give the reader the necessary background 
knowledge to understand the upcoming analysis. Furthermore, it discusses the 
relationship between intellectual property rights and technology transfer as well as 
the implications for pharmaceutical patents. 
Chapter 3 explains the TRIPS-Agreement, providing some general information 
about the Agreement, along with facts regarding how the Agreement views patent 
protection and technology transfer. It also sheds light on some important 
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limitations of the TRIPS related to compulsory licensing and technology transfer, 
highlighting the need for other documents in order to clarify how some articles of 
the Agreement are intended to be interpreted. 
Chapter 4 is devoted to compulsory licensing, which is the central concern of the 
investigation. This chapter discusses the important international agreements 
mentioned in the previous chapter, such as the Doha Declaration and the August 
30 Agreement, which need to be considered when interpreting the TRIPS and 
attempting to find an answer to the introduction question. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the impact of these agreements on compulsory licensing, and 
subsequently on technology transfer, especially pharmaceuticals, in order to see 
whether compulsory licensing appears to be a good tool or not for technology 
transfer.  
Finally, the thesis ends with a conclusion and a final statement, presenting the 
arguments found to support the claims. 
Compulsory licensing under the TRIPS-Agreement: a tool for developing countries’ access to 
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2. Intellectual Property Rights 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Intellectual property rights are ”instruments of public policy which confer 
economic privileges on individuals or institutions solely for the purposes of 
contributing to the greater public good.”16 IPRs essentially give their holder an 
exclusive right (similar to a monopoly) of using the invention in question, and 
prevent others from using it without his or her consent for a certain time
17
.  
The WIPO defines intellectual property, IP, as “creations of the mind,”18 e.g. 
images, symbols, designs and names used in commerce, inventions, as well as 
literary and artistic works. Intellectual property is thus related to the scientific, 
industrial, artistic and literary fields, and involves legal rights which governments 
attempt to protect both through national legislation and by means of international 
agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement.
19
 The reason for this is that nations 
wish to clearly define the rights of the creators as well as those of the public 
regarding the creations considered as IP. Furthermore, the scope is to contribute to 
long-run social and economic development by providing incentives to creators of 
intellectual property.
20
 
IP can be divided into copyright and industrial property. The latter refers to 
industrial designs, patents, geographical indications of source and trademarks, 
                                                 
16 www.wipo.org, “What is Intellectual Property?” www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/ 
17 The TRIPS Agreement, Art. 28.1.a 
18 www.wipo.org 
19 www.wipo.org 
20 www.wipo.org 
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while copyright incorporates artistic and literary works, inter alia musical works, 
and artistic works.  
 Intellectual property rights, IPRs, are established for things similar to public 
goods, which are nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption, e.g. sewage 
systems.
21
 If a sewage system is produced in a particular area to keep a river 
clean, it will have the same effect for all citizens in that area. The fact that it may 
benefit one person does not lead to it being consumed and thus no longer 
available to benefit others. Goods which are protected by intellectual property 
laws, such as a particular technology, work in the same way.
22
 If the developing 
world would have access to the same say, pharmaceuticals, as the developed 
world, it would not prevent citizens in developed nations from using 
pharmaceuticals as well. A problem is the prevalence of free rides, which often 
cannot be prevented from using the good in question.
23
 This poses a problem 
because creating e.g. a masterpiece, a new software or a new pharmaceutical 
requires the investment of significant time, effort and money. In order for a person 
or corporation to invest all of this into a project, there are expectations of profits. 
Therefore, creating something which others can use freely without having to pay 
for it is discouraging for a producer, who would lose his or her incentive for 
innovation. For this reason, the existence of well defined property rights is 
essential for innovation of any kind.
24
 One must keep in mind, though, that the 
real purpose of IPRs is more than the temporary protection of a particular 
producer’s rights. The true purpose is to create incentives to innovate, in order to 
make development possible and thus encourage the progress of society.
25
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Krugman, P., & Wells, R., 2005, Microeconomics, Worth Publishers, p.479 
22 Nguyen, p.13 
23 Ibid 
24 Sykes, p.16 
25 www.wipo.org 
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2.2 Intellectual Property Rights and Technology Transfer 
 
The relationship between IPRs and technology transfer is debatable. From the 
perspective of the developing world, IPRs can be viewed as an obstacle to 
technology transfer. This is due to the fact that higher levels of protection to 
patent holders and the need for e.g. compulsory licensing make it more difficult to 
import essential technology than in the markets which are freer, inter alia like the 
textile industry.
26
 Simultaneously, patent holders have power similar to that of a 
monopolist,
27
 being able to set high prices which developing countries cannot 
afford to pay. This way, strong IPRs can prevent developing countries from being 
able to acquire technology, and may thus be counterproductive considering their 
real purpose.  
The developed world, however, finds IPRs to be an essential condition for 
innovation,
28
 because without the guaranteed profits, producers would lose their 
incentives to make the necessary investments to develop innovations. From this 
perspective, the existence of IPRs, as mentioned, enables innovation and 
technology transfer. 
 
2.3 Pharmaceutical Patents 
 
One of the most important types of technology transfer needed in developing 
nations is the transfer of pharmaceuticals. As briefly mentioned, the developing 
world suffers from prominent, widespread disease such as HIV, but also Malaria 
and drug resistant tuberculosis,
29
 and is in acute need of relevant pharmaceuticals.  
Pharmaceuticals are also the type of technology for which patent protection is 
particularly strong.
30
 In the production of pharmaceuticals, most of the costs are 
                                                 
26 Sykes, p.15 
27 Lidgard & Atik, 2005, p.5 
28 Nguyen, p.13  
29 Sykes, p.3 
30 Sykes, p.16 
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related to R&D and in receiving regulatory approval.
31
 Hans Henrik Lidgard and 
Jeff Atik find that “a new chemical entity appears on average to require an 
investment far exceeding 100 million USD and requires more than ten years of 
systematic development and testing before the final product can be authorized.”32 
The actual cost of producing the pharmaceuticals themselves is not very high once 
the R&D is finished, and the pharmaceutical has been approved. Having this in 
mind, it is easy to understand why patent holders in the pharmaceutical industry 
are so keen on securing their rights. Without satisfactory IPRs, the incentive to 
invest these monumental amounts of money and time would vanish, resulting in 
less production within the pharmaceutical sector, which could have disastrous 
effects on world health. Therefore, it is vital to realize that while most of us 
consider that the developing world is entitled to help, it is not to be forgotten that 
the pharmaceutical industry invests a lot in its goods, which ultimately benefit 
human health, and thus deserves to receive protection. Although the 
pharmaceuticals may not be distributed to the developing world to the same extent 
as in the developed countries, the medicines produced are essential to human life 
and health, and thus the serious need to protect these producers  appears obvious. 
 
2.3.1  Pharmaceutical patents, monopoly power & losses to society 
 
As mentioned, an argument in favor of innovators is that IPRs are needed in order  
for innovation to occur. On the other hand, though, one cannot refrain from noting 
the monopolistic effect that a patent may imply. When holding a patent, an 
innovator has the power to prevent competition regarding products covered by the 
patent. The economic view on monopoly is that it creates deadweight losses,
33
 
since a monopolist has the power to charge higher prices than the cost of 
production, leading to higher prices than would exist if there were competition on 
the market.
34
 This may not imply such a significant problem, if the patented 
                                                 
   31 Lidgard & Atik, 2007, p.1056 
32 Ibid 
    33 A deadweight loss is defines as “the value of mutually beneficial transactions that do not occur because 
of monopoly behavior. Alan “Microeconomics”, Krugman & Wells, p. 348  
34 “Market Power in Antitrust cases”, Lander, William & Posner, Richard, Harvard Law Review, nr. 937, 
1981  
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product would be one which is not truly needed, such as a luxury good. However, 
if the patented product happens to be an important one, inter alia HIV medicine, 
and is lacking close substitutes, the implications can be very severe for those in 
need of the medication but unable to pay the high price charged by the patent 
holder.   
Therefore, it can be argued that despite the needs of patent holders to receive 
protection, the costs on society of this are exceedingly high, because the 
monopoly power of the patent holder can result in the loss of millions of lives. 
Consequently, it is not unreasonable to state that patent rights may be too strong 
in the case of pharmaceuticals.   
Returning to monopoly power, one can find an additional view on this. Sykes 
goes as far as expressing that “monopolists may invest resources in obtaining 
monopoly, thereby dissipating monopoly profits ex ante and causing further 
deadweight losses.”35 Excessive investments in the race to develop a new 
invention are predominantly common in the case of patents, leading to so called 
“patent races,”36 causing dissipated monopoly rents. Consequently, the extent of 
monopoly power held by a patent holder determines the extent of the produced 
deadweight loss. Still, this loss is accepted due to the returns it generates to the 
patent holders and the investors, and is, as mentioned, considered necessary in 
order for these to find it worthwhile to strive for innovation.  
However, what is interesting is that the level of patent protection is the same for 
all types of innovations, without taking account of the costs of developing the 
innovation that thus need to be recovered. As a result, some innovations are over-
rewarded, while others are under-rewarded.
37
 Therefore, in a case where a 
particular patent (usually pharmaceuticals) may be viewed as receiving excessive 
protection, one can argue that it is not filling the function of protecting incentives. 
Alan Sykes expresses it in the following manner: “If one had reason to believe 
that the patent protection afforded in a particular context was excessive, such a 
“property right” could not be defended as important to valuable incentives.”38 In 
                                                 
35 Sykes, p.11 
36 Sykes, p.12 
37 Sykes, p.13 
38 Ibid 
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fact, its existence would imply a level of deadweight loss that is unnecessarily 
high, while giving the patent holder a stronger monopoly right than needed for 
him/her to feel that the investments incurred in the innovation were worthwhile. 
Since it is generally the pharmaceutical patents that are viewed as “over-
rewarded”, one can draw an important conclusion: In order to prevent the 
deadweight loss, which can be substantial considering that human lives are at 
stake, it is vital to have some form of Agreement or international legal framework 
which can act as a tool to prevent this loss. As will be noted in the following 
chapters, compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement appears to be such a 
tool.  
 
2.4 ACTA 
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, ACTA, is still under negotiation, and 
as opposed to the other agreements that will be examined in this thesis, it is an 
international agreement attempting to “create improved international standards as 
to how to act against large-scale infringements of IPRs”39 without taking too 
much consideration to the needs of the developing world.
40
 The negotiations 
began in October 2007, between the United States, The European Community, 
Japan and Switzerland, however other countries such as Mexico,  Singapore, 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada have joined the negotiations in the mean 
time. The ACTA deals with physical goods as well as information technology and 
internet distribution, its aim being the reduction, or rather, the prevention of inter 
alia “piracy”, and other violations of intellectual property laws, which have 
become a widespread problem. While aspiring to “address the problem of 
infringement of intellectual property rights, including that which takes place in the 
digital environment, and with respect to copyright or related rights in particular in 
a manner that balances the right and interests of the relevant right holders, service 
providers and users,”41 it is not intended to implement new IPRs. 
                                                 
39 ACTA, Fact sheet, 2009, European Commission, http://ec.eu.europa.org 
40 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Electronic Frontier Foundation, www.eff.org/issues/acta 
41 Consolidated text, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft: 2 
October 2010, p.2 
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It is to be noted, however, that the ACTA is not intended to contradict the TRIPS 
Agreement, which will be studied in the following chapter. The ACTA clearly 
stipulates that “Nothing in this Agreement shall derogate from any obligation of a 
Party with respect to any other Party under existing agreements, including the 
WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.”42  
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Art. 1.1 
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3. The TRIPS Agreement 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the 
TRIPS Agreement, is, apart from the GATT and GATS, one of the three chief 
agreements of the WTO. It was adopted in 1994, with the aim of providing an 
international agreement determining IPRs, and thus providing protection for 
multinational corporations, MNCs,
43
 largely due to the pressure perceived from 
the developed world. The Most Favored Nation Principle,
44
 the National 
Treatment Principle,
45
 and transparency requirements are cornerstones in the 
TRIPS Agreement, which also “provides basic substantive principles on the 
protection and enforcement of IPRs,”46 The TRIPS Agreement was intended to 
serve as a very useful tool, since it had to be ratified by all member states of the 
WTO, also resulting in a more simple way of solving possible disputes between 
the members through the DSU,
47
 the Dispute Settlement Understanding. This 
international Agreement has facilitated trade between nations by assuring a higher 
level of security due to the fact that all member states must comply with its rules. 
The international protection of IPRs that the TRIPS provides thus encourages 
trade, which is of high significance for the economies of the developing world. 
This implies, in theory, that goods and services, such as technology transfer in the 
form of R&D and pharmaceuticals, which are vital to development, were made 
more available through the implementation of the TRIPS agreement. 
                                                 
43 Lidgard & Atik, 2005, p.4 
   44 TRIPS Agreement Art.4  
45 TRIPS Agreement Art.3 
46 Nguyen, p.11 
47 “The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes” 
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Looking from this perspective, the TRIPS Agreement appears to be a useful tool 
for technology transfer to the developing world. Usually this view is held by 
WTO member states such as the EU, Japan and the US, who are the ones mostly 
requiring the protection of intellectual property, since these states are the ones 
developing most of the new technology due to their extensive investments in 
R&D.
48
 This view, however, is not necessarily shared by developing countries, 
since extensive IPR protection generally makes it more difficult to acquire 
technology from the developed world. For this reason the developing countries 
have been given freer access to markets such as textiles and agriculture, on the 
condition that they respect the IPRs of other member states imposed by the TRIPS 
Agreement.
49
 This, however, was not enough according to many countries in the 
developing world. Therefore, in order to aid the developing world in an 
increasingly comprehensive manner, the WTO produced the “Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,”50 which will be examined in the following 
chapter.  
 
3.2 Patent Protection under the TRIPS Agreement 
 
The patent rules of the TRIPS Agreement are an extension of those of the Paris, 
Berne and Rome Conventions to all WTO members.
51
 The rules comprise three 
conditions which must be fulfilled  in order for a patent to be granted,
52
 namely 
those of novelty, inventiveness and industrial applicability.  
The TRIPS Agreement regulates patent protection in articles 27-34.
53
 In article 27 
we find that “patents must be made available for all inventions, whether products 
or processes, and must last for at least twenty years from the date of the filing of a 
patent application.”54 Moreover, a patent holder has exclusive rights to produce, 
                                                 
48 Nguyen, p.10  
49 Sykes, p.15 
50 The Doha Declaration  
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52 TRIPS Agreement Art. 27 
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utilize, offer for sale or sell both the patented product itself, as well as the product 
that may be produced from a patented process.
55
 Moreover, according to the 
TRIPS Agreement “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive 
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not reasonably 
conflict with normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the patent owner /.../.”56  
 
Furthermore, a patent holder has the exclusive right to import the product which is 
patented or created from the patented process. Nevertheless, member countries 
have the possibility to make a few exceptions, and refuse to issue patents in 
certain cases, even if they fulfill the required criteria.
57
 For instance, a member 
can choose not to grant patents for an invention which may damage the morality 
or ordre public, i.e. the fundamental values behind the legislation of a nation. The 
same is valid if it is reasonable to believe that granting a patent would involve a 
risk to the life or health of humans, animals or plants, or if it could result in 
significant environmental degradation.
58
 A member cannot, however, apply the 
right to make exceptions regarding innovations such as pharmaceuticals. 
Regarding pharmaceuticals, Jeff Atik and Hans Henrik Lidgard state that 
“protection is granted for the chemical composition, production methods, and the 
ensuing product, as well as different modes of application.”59 
Because of the significant economic differences between developed and 
developing countries, though, the latter were permitted transitional provisions as 
stated in articles 65 and 66.
60
 For instance, developing countries were allowed a 
five year delay of applying most of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement after 
its entry into force, thus until January 1
st
 2000.
61
 LDCs were presented firstly with 
the possibility to comply with the obligations of the Agreement within six years,
62
 
however, as will be explained shortly, the time frame was extended to January 
                                                 
55 TRIPS Agreement Art.28, see also Sykes p.6 
56 TRIPS Agreement Art.30 
57 TRIPS Agreement Art.27 
58 TRIPS Agreement Art.27 
59 Lidgard & Atik, 2007, p.1057 
60 Länsisyrjä, p.39  
61 TRIPS Agreement Art. 65.2-3 
62 TRIPS Agreement Art.66.1 
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2016. Finally, there were developing nations which, prior to the ratification of the 
TRIPS Agreement, did not have any type of patent protection for e.g. 
pharmaceuticals (or some other particular field of technology). These countries 
had until January 2005 to “enforce patent rights in that area.”63  
As a final point, one should keep in mind that the TRIPS Agreements only 
provides minimum standards, and there is nothing preventing member states from 
developing their national laws further: “Members may, but shall not be obliged to, 
implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement.”64 The implications of this can be discussed. On the one hand, it can 
be considered that the WTO made a good choice by granting freedom to its 
members to decide for themselves how comprehensive national laws they wish to 
have on this topic. On the other hand, it can be argued, as Daniel Gervais does, 
that the TRIPS Agreement  “did not achieve all that some countries wished.”65 
 
3.3 Limitations of articles 30 and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement 
As mentioned, the provision of Article 30 is rather unclear, thus it is difficult to 
deduce exactly what is meant by “limited exceptions”. Also article 31 contains a 
number of uncertainties related to when and how compulsory licensing is to be 
regarded as appropriate.
66
  Hans Lidgard and Jeff Atik have looked on the article 
and found four significant provisions which are unclear:
67
 
1. “When a situation of national emergency can be invoked 
2. How much effort must be employed to reach a voluntary agreement with 
the patent holder before a failure has been established 
3. What royalty compensation must be awarded to the rights holder  
4. Whether least developed countries with no production capacity may rely 
on importation” 
                                                 
63 TRIPS Agreement Art. 65(4) 
64 TRIPS Agreement Art. 1(1) 
65 Gervais, supra note 104, p. 86 
66 Lidgard & Atik, 2005, p.6 
67 Lidgard & Atik, 2007, p. 1049 
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The TRIPS Agreement allows importing member countries to decide for 
themselves how to interpret and decide on these uncertainties, as long as the 
decision is in accordance with TRIPS procedure. It is also useful to note the 
general security exemption of art. 73, which permits members “wide discretion to 
take any action it considers necessary in time of war or other emergency.”68 
Consequently, Lidgard and Atik find that “this provision relieves a party from 
virtually all of its substantial obligations under TRIPS.”69  
These uncertainties of the TRIPS Agreement were considered a rather significant 
problem, and it was the desire to solve it that lead to the creation of the 
“Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,” which will be studied 
in the following chapter.  
 
3.3 Technology Transfer under the TRIPS Agreement 
 
The TRIPS Agreement states in Art.7 that the scope of the protection and 
enforcement of IPRs is to “contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology”. Moreover, this is 
intended to benefit both the suppliers and consumers of the technology “in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare.”70 
Thus, from looking at this paragraph, it appears clear that the TRIPS Agreement 
recognizes the importance of and attempts to promote technology transfer, which 
is one significant factor “conducive to social and economic welfare.”71 It thus 
becomes clear that one of the purposes of the TRIPS Agreement is to work as a 
tool for contributing to technology transfer. 
Since all members of the WTO are bound by the TRIPS Agreement, they are also 
obliged to comply with Art.7, which thus encourages us to consider the 
Agreement to be, at least in theory, a useful tool. 
                                                 
68 TRIPS Agreement Art.73 
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Moreover, the Agreement stipulates that WTO member countries may “adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development.”72 It is also stated that “appropriate measures /…/ 
may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders 
or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology.”73  
The TRIPS Agreement appears to clearly indicate that its scope is, apart from 
protecting intellectual property rights, to promote technology transfer. However, 
despite this indication, if the Agreement is to truly benefit the developing 
countries then they must have the capacity to receive this transfer of technology 
and subsequently experience the social and economic development which that 
would result in. Unfortunately, this is not always the case, as the prices of 
technology are by far too high for them to afford. For this reason, there are 
conflicting views on this issue, between the desire of the developed world to 
promote and encourage innovation, and the strong need of the developing 
countries to acquire important technology such as pharmaceuticals. Sadly, a 
common view is that the TRIPS Agreement is in fact mostly benefitting the 
developed countries, intensifying their monopoly privileges and economic power. 
This is especially true for the pharmaceutical  industry, which is one of the most 
desperately needed in developing countries. As a result, the transfer of technology 
to developing countries has not expanded very much, as can be seen in the extent 
of the HIV/AIDS crisis,
74
 which is, unfortunately, still exceedingly extensive.  
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4. Compulsory Licensing 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Due to the pressing needs for technology transfer in the developing world, 
compulsory licensing has become an option offered by both national laws and the 
TRIPS Agreements. As will be described in more detail below, compulsory 
licensing allows a legitimate authority to issue licenses to others than the holder of 
the intellectual property rights of a particular good or process, without the consent 
of the latter. Although this can only take place under certain conditions, it is 
intended to offer an opportunity in the attempt to facilitate, among other things, 
the transfer of technology to the developing world. If e.g. a Kenyan corporation 
would receive a compulsory license to produce the HIV drug flucanozole,
75
 the 
drug could be produced at a much lower cost than by the corporation holding the 
patent, since the latter was obligated to pay large amounts of money on R&D and 
on regulatory approval,
76
 resulting in the need to require high prices for the 
produced pharmaceuticals in order to receive revenues higher than the total costs 
of production. This, however, is not something the holder of a compulsory license  
is forced to do, since the R&D has already been completed, as well as the gaining 
of the regulatory approval. Therefore, the holder of a compulsory license could set 
a significantly lower price, which could literally mean the difference between life 
and death to the domestic population, without violating international standards of 
patent protection. For instance, the price of 150 Mg of flucanozole in India is 55 
USD,
77
 because it is not protected by a patent, while in the Philippines, where 
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patent protection occurs for the drug, the price is as high as 817 USD,
78
 which of 
course implies a monumental difference in opportunities for the populations in 
question to purchase the drug. Thus, if compulsory licensing can result in prices 
being such that a larger part of the population could afford to purchase essential 
pharmaceuticals, it would indeed be a successful result of technology transfer, and 
therefore, it would also reflect the success of our current international laws and 
agreements on intellectual property rights and compulsory licenses.  
Compulsory licensing may thus be regarded as a helpful tool in technology 
transfer, because the possibility it bring allows companies to produce crucial 
technologies such as pharmaceuticals at acceptable prices, resulting in the 
possibility of setting a price which consumers can afford. Consequently, 
compulsory licensing can bring help to the poor without breaking international 
laws or agreements. From this perspective, compulsory licensing appears to be not 
only a good tool, but rather an excellent one. 
 
4.2 Compulsory Licensing under the TRIPS Agreement 
 
Compulsory licensing is allowed under the TRIPS-Agreement article 31, and 
implies a right to produce or import a patented item without the actual consent of 
the patent holder.
79
 In order for a compulsory license to be issued, however, there 
are certain requirements that must be satisfied.
80
 Firstly, compulsory licenses are 
only granted if the purpose is for them to be used “predominantly for the supply 
of the domestic market,”81 and a license is “limited to the purpose for which it 
was authorized.”82 Secondly, one must during a “reasonable period of time”83 
attempt to negotiate with the holder of the right, striving to  convince him or her 
                                                 
78 Sykes, p.1. See also the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the High 
Commissioner, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights on 
Human Rights §44, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 2001) 
79 Sykes, p.7 
80 TRIPS Agreement Art. 31 
81 TRIPS Agreement Art. 31(f) 
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to willingly grant a license. One is also required to offer commercial terms that 
are reasonable for both parties. When granted a compulsory license, one is 
required to pay adequate remunerations to the right holder,
84
 “taking into account 
the economic value of the authorization.”85 Compulsory licenses may also be 
granted in the face of a national emergency.
86
 
Today we find that the developing nations are undoubtedly affected by epidemic 
diseases to the extent that they are undoubtedly considered to fall into the 
category of “emergency situations,”87 which entitle them to the use of compulsory 
licenses.  
This has not always been the case, though. If one is to look on the development of 
the TRIPS, one can find that there was a problem. There were originally quite 
obvious limitations to the TRIPS Agreement, because the solutions offered by the 
Agreement were long-term, while the needs in the developing world were urgent. 
In order to acquire and distribute the required pharmaceuticals, a nation must have 
know-how, technology and education to be able to produce the pharmaceuticals in 
question, as well as functioning institutions and an infrastructure that is capable of 
distributing the medicine to those in need. The reality is, however, that the 
developing countries did not, and still do not have these resources. For this 
reason, the Africa Group found a need to slightly clarify  the conditions offered by 
TRIPS Agreement, and this began at the Ministerial Conference meeting in Doha, 
2001.
88
  
 
4.3 The Doha Declaration 
 
Due to the limitations of the TRIPS Agreement regarding the health crisis in the 
developing world, WTO member countries recognized the need for change, and 
discussed the issue during the Ministerial conference in Doha, Qatar, in 
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November 2001, forming “The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health”, more frequently referred to as “the Doha Declaration.”89 The reason for 
the Doha Declaration was not only the will of the developing world to clarify 
some articles of the TRIPS, but also the desire of some developed countries, 
prominently e.g. the US and Switzerland, to protect their interpretation of the 
Agreement.
90
 It should be noted, however, that the Doha Declaration did not alter 
the TRIPS Agreement, it is merely a ministerial interpretation of the Agreement 
intended to clarify the uncertainties. During the meeting, members reached the 
conclusion that “TRIPS can and should be interpreted in a manner supportive of 
WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in particular to promote access 
to medicines for all.”91 Theoretically, this implied a right of WTO members to 
grant compulsory licenses freely and “decide on the grounds therefore.”92 With 
the implementation of the Doha Declaration, compulsory licensing came to be 
viewed as an acceptable tool for making pharmaceuticals more accessible in 
developing countries.
93
 The implementation of this decision was intended to 
provide the developing world with necessary pharmaceuticals, giving the region a 
chance to improve the health of its populations and thus relieve the countries to 
some extent from the pressing health crisis.  
Another identified goal was that of providing relief for countries with no 
production capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. However the decision to find an 
effective, short term solution to this problem turned out to be quite difficult. This 
was due to the rather selfish nature of some of the member countries involved; 
often nations targeted their own self-interest as opposed to that of the developing 
world, who’s problems were in fact the reason for discussion.94 The United States, 
for instance, was such a member. Hans Henrik Lidgard and Jeffrey Atik find that 
the US suggested to “limit the types of products that would be available for 
compulsory licensing to medicines to combat epidemic diseases and to reduce the 
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number of countries that would be eligible as both importers and exporters of 
these products.”95  
Similar views were held by other members, and despite the compromise 
suggested by the European Union, no final decision was made until August 30, 
2003, referred to as “the August 30 Agreement”.  
Returning to the Doha Declaration, however, it is essential to recognize that it has 
thoroughly clarified some parts of the TRIPS Agreement which were quite 
unclear.
96
 One such vagueness is found in TRIPS art. 31, regarding compulsory 
licensing, where the Agreement refers to “other use”, while the Doha Declaration 
clarifies the meaning of the expression by referring to it explicitly as “compulsory 
licenses”. This specification in the Doha Declaration may be viewed as a means to 
highlight the existence and importance of compulsory licenses.
97
 Furthermore, 
apart from stipulating that members have the right to grant compulsory licenses, 
the Doha Declaration also specifies under what conditions they may be granted.
98
 
It is also stated that members are entitled to determine themselves exactly what is 
to be considered a “national or extreme emergency”, under which TRIPS allows 
compulsory licensing. What is particularly encouraging is that the Declaration 
overtly specifies that the widespread health concerns of the developing world, 
namely HIV/AIDS, may unmistakably be viewed as an emergency of the sort.
99
  
Another vagueness of the TRIPS Agreement which the Doha Declaration clarifies 
is that when interpreting and applying the TRIPS, members must always 
recognize that they have an apparent right to protect public health. The 
interpretation of the TRIPS should not be such that it in any way goes in 
opposition to this objective. Moreover, the Doha Declaration stipulates that the 
TRIPS is not in any way intended to be implemented in a way which would imply 
a prevention of access to medicines, on the contrary!
100
 The ministers creating the 
Declaration “agree that the TRIPs Agreement does not and should not prevent 
Members from taking measures to protect public health,”, adding that it “can and 
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should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ 
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all.”101 It should also be highlighted that the Doha Declaration recognizes the 
“gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and least 
developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics.
102
   
To conclude, the Doha declaration clarifies the uncertainties of the TRIPS related 
to compulsory licensing in the following way:
103
  
a) “In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of 
the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its 
objectives and principles. 
b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom 
to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted. 
c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood 
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
d) The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to 
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free 
to establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject 
to the MFN
104
 and national treatment provisions of articles 3 and 4.”105 
What is important to note in this paragraph of the Doha Declaration is firstly the 
implications of §a), which stipulates that the interpretation of the TRIPS should 
occur in agreement with the core objectives and principles of the Agreement. A 
prominent principle in this case is the one found in TRIPS article 8, stating that 
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“Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health.”106 Another important thing to note is 
found in §c, which clarifies that the public health crisis occurring in many 
developing countries falls within the category “national emergency.” This implies 
that there is no need for the relevant countries to negotiate with the right holders 
in order to receive compulsory licenses.
107
   
Additionally, the Doha Declaration specifies that the transitional period of LDCs 
regarding the implementation of patent protection on pharmaceuticals is to be 
extended to January 2016. 
108
 
However, one should keep in mind that the Doha Declaration is a ministerial 
declaration, and is thus not a legally binding document. Nevertheless, since the 
Doha Declaration is an interpretation of the uncertainties under the TRIPS 
Agreement, and not in any way a contradiction to it, it is reasonable to believe that 
it will serve as a powerful tool when interpreting the TRIPS Agreement. This is 
likely to be true also in the case of possible disputes between WTO members.
109
  
In conclusion, the very prevalence of the Doha Declaration can be considered to 
make a powerful statement; the fact that the WTO has bothered to develop an 
entire declaration on public health issues in the developing world relating to IPRs, 
reflects an increased acknowledgement of the strong correlation between the two, 
and the high importance of improving the crisis in the developing world. There 
are many contradicting views on to what extent this is true, however, Amit Gupta 
interpreted the declaration as the first time the WTO “openly acknowledged that 
the public health problems in many countries were in part a result of the 
intellectual property regime under the TRIPS Agreement.”110 In any case, the 
Doha Declaration has served as a useful tool for specifying the uncertainties of the 
TRIPS Agreement, and is a framework which offers support to the needs of the 
developing world. Thus the Doha Declaration has, through the clarifications 
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provided, turned the TRIPS Agreement into a more useful tool than it was 
initially.  
  
 4.3.1 The August 30 Agreement 
This Agreement “refers merely to pharmaceutical products needed to address a 
public health problem with a reference to the Doha Declaration.”111 Furthermore, 
in the statement of the chairman, it is stipulated that the August 30 Agreement is 
not in any way intended to be used as a tool for pursuing commercial or industrial 
policy objectives, but for protecting public health.
112
 The August 30 Agreement 
sheds light on some issues which might appear unclear in the TRIPS Agreement 
that were not clarified in the Doha Declaration. For instance, the August 30 
Agreement stipulates that although the developing countries are the ones expected 
to seek compulsory licenses, they are not the only ones entitled to receive them. A 
developed nation can invoke the right to obtain a compulsory license as well, 
however, as opposed to a developing country, the developed one must 
demonstrate that an urgent situation situation occurs in the country. The 
prerequisite of domestic production found in TRIPS art. 31(f) is ignored under the 
August 30 Agreement if the following requirements are met:
113
  
1. An importing country must make an application to the WTO  
2. Should an exporting country receives a compulsory license, it is obliged 
to give notice to the WTO. Additionally, the license must be restricted to 
the amount needed to meet the requests of the importing country.   
3. Moreover, by means of unmistakable marking and labeling, products 
must be discernible. Also, one is required to publish relevant information 
regarding this on the internet.
114
 
As a result, when reading the requirements under the August 30 Agreement and 
article 31 of the TRIPS Agreements, it becomes clear that before a WTO member 
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may receive a compulsory license, there are several requirements that must be 
fulfilled.    
 
4.5 Implications for the Pharmaceutical industry 
The authorization of compulsory licensing has had important implications for the 
pharmaceutical industry of the industrialized world, in favor of the developing 
countries. The pharmaceutical industry is not too contented with the possibility of 
compulsory licensing, and thus feels threatened by developing countries, fearing 
they may request these licenses. Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry has 
agreed to supply the developing world with HIV/AIDS medicines, at prices 
significantly lower than in the developed world.
115
 Thus the clarifications of the 
TRIPS Agreement have given the pharmaceutical industry a choice: to accept 
compulsory licenses for their pharmaceuticals, or providing the necessitating 
countries with pharmaceuticals at a price level they can afford. Evidently, it 
appears that the path of choice is that of supplying needed medicines to 
developing countries. This, however, leads to price discrimination,
116
 which has 
certain implications. When prices are low in LDCs and high in developed 
countries, there is high risk of arbitration, i.e. the possibility of purchasing the 
drugs in LDCs where they are cheap, and offer them for sale in developed 
countries, though at lower prices than those set by the pharmaceutical industry. 
That way, the drugs would flow back to the developed countries, resulting in an 
economic loss to the patent holders, and a loss of the very needed supply of drugs 
in the developing nations. Therefore, controls in the form of suitable legal 
regulations are required, otherwise the system would backfire.  
In conclusion, the evidence at hand reflects that, although in a different way than 
intended, compulsory licenses are useful tools for technology transfer. The 
provisions of the TRIPS, including the clarifications made through the Doha 
Declaration and the August 30 Agreement,  have resulted in price discrimination, 
which, ultimately, fulfill the intended aspiration of providing access of 
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pharmaceuticals to developing countries. One may also note the goodwill of the 
WTO for developing both the Doha Declaration and the August 30 Agreement for 
the sole purpose of clarifying the TRIPS agreement, thus aiding the international 
community in understanding the intention behind compulsory licensing as well as 
the conditions under which these are to be granted and used.  
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5. Conclusion 
Today, it is difficult to question the fact that the developing world is in acute need 
of technology transfer. The health crisis in the developing world, with HIV/AIDS 
at the front, is one important and highly debated example of the need for 
technology transfer, in which compulsory licensing is significant. The making of 
the TRIPS Agreement, but perhaps even more so the formation of the Doha 
Declaration and the August 30 Agreement, reflects that not only the WTO but 
also the world as a whole appears to recognize the severity of the problem, and 
the importance to overcome it. It is evident, that the solution to this problem lies 
in international cooperation, implying a responsibility of the international 
community to apply international laws and conventions in a manner which 
supports the developing world in receiving essential technology transfer. The 
TRIPS Agreement is one tool which is to be interpreted and implemented in such 
a way. With the creation of the Doha Declaration and the August 30 Agreement, 
which have explained and clarified the ambiguous elements of the TRIPS, the 
WTO member countries have attempted to strengthen this tool further, and this 
appears to have been successful.  
The question is then, if compulsory licensing is a useful tool in this aim of 
supporting and increasing the extent of technology transfer to the developing 
world? From this investigation, the answer appears to be yes, due to several 
reasons.  
Firstly, the very possibility to receive a compulsory license makes it possible for 
developing countries to produce e.g. essential medicines, and sell them at a price 
level that the domestic population could afford, thus enabling more people in need 
of the drugs to acquire them. One could argue that the presence of a compulsory 
license does not guarantee that the ones in need will receive the looked-for 
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medicines, due to weaknesses in domestic infrastructure, poor institutions, high 
levels of corruption, etc, which all influence to what extent the needed medicines 
can reach the recipients. It is true that the mentioned factors are important, and 
indeed, if those are lacking in quality, the medicines may not be distributed to all 
who need them, however the prevalence of compulsory licensing enables what 
would otherwise not be possible. Indeed it is true, that due to social and economic 
problems in a particular developing country, the effects of a particular compulsory 
license may not be as great as they could be if the social and economic conditions 
were increasingly developed. However, this is not in reality a valid argument, 
since it is obvious that developing countries are not at the same social and 
economic levels as the developed world and are thus unable to use and distribute 
resources as well- that is why they are referred to as “developing” countries. It is 
vital to note that although compulsory licensing may not benefit all in need, if it 
benefits more people than was the case before the introduction of the license, then 
it is to be viewed as useful for the particular developing country. 
Secondly, compulsory licensing is a useful tool because it causes prices of 
pharmaceuticals to fall considerably by “threatening” the pharmaceutical industry. 
The latter has, due to the rules on compulsory licensing, an incentive to supply 
developing markets with needed pharmaceuticals at low prices, because if not, 
“generic producers holding compulsory licenses could undertake activities which 
could ultimately be launched in the markets of the industrialized world.”117 The 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement allowing for compulsory licensing have thus 
resulted in the fact that the pharmaceutical industry now supplies escalating 
amounts of required medicines to developing countries, at considerably lower 
prices than beforehand. Additionally, the possibility to invoke compulsory 
licenses reduces the extent of monopoly power enjoyed by some patent holders, 
and thus results in more competition on the market. 
It was mentioned at the end of chapter 3 that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is still 
widespread in the developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, 
hinting perhaps that compulsory licensing has not been an all too successful tool 
for increasing technology transfer to developing nations. This, however, would 
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not in actual fact be a reasonable conclusion, because the prevalence of the 
epidemic does not only depend on the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. There 
are countless social and economic factors which play a part in the HIV epidemic, 
and it is possible that compulsory licensing in itself, as a legal tool, is successful, 
however there are other factors intervening, inter alia corruption and poor 
infrastructure, which may reduce the positive effects of the licenses or even 
prevent them from occurring. Therefore, this argument is built on speculations 
and not reliable facts, as it would require an investigation far beyond the means of 
a bachelor thesis to truly find the correct answer to exactly how compulsory 
licensing has affected inter alia the HIV/AIDS epidemic from an economic, legal 
and social perspective. From the legal perspective, however, which is the only one 
of real significance in this thesis, compulsory licensing under the TRIPS 
Agreement has proved to be successful.  
The conclusion is thus, that by surveying the evidence at hand, it is unambiguous 
that the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement regarding compulsory licensing have 
made countless patent holders within the pharmaceutical industry willing to 
provide patented medicines at low prices in developing countries, which is 
unmistakably a considerable accomplishment. Accordingly, compulsory licensing 
under the TRIPS Agreement is a useful tool for technology transfer.  
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